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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
INTRODUCTION

During the period between September 1, 1996 and August 31, 1997,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided several cases concerning
environmental issues. Of particular note ' are three cases involving contribution suits brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). ' In the
1995 case United States v. Colorado & EasternRailroad Co.,' the Tenth
Circuit clarified the distinction between cost recovery suits brought under section 107 of CERCLA, and contribution suits under section 113.'
The three cases decided this survey period further clarify the distinction
made in Colorado & Eastern, but also indicate a lingering confusion
regarding the relationship between section 107 cost recovery section 113
contribution actions Part I of this survey discusses the statutory and
judicial background of CERCLA, including Colorado & Eastern, and
then analyzes the holdings of each of the three recent Tenth Circuit cases
on which this survey focuses.
The Tenth Circuit also decided a procedural standing case. The
claim involved a challenge to the United States Forest Service's decision
not to prepare an environmental impact statement before issuing a special
use permit to a ski area corporation. Procedural standing, particularly
when used to challenge forest plans under the National Forest Management Act, has generated much comment and confusion since the United
States Supreme Court first mentioned, without fully explaining, the concept in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife." Part II of this survey examines
the Tenth Circuit interpretation of procedural standing in Committee to
Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero.' This decision clarifies much of the confusion, and may provide an opportunity for environmental plaintiffs to
expand the use of procedural standing in the future.

1. Also of note, but not discussed here, is City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415 (10th
Cir. 1996) (holding that Native American tribes could establish stricter water quality standards than
federal standards, and that the EPA has the authority to require upstream dischargers to comply with
the tribal standards. For a discussion of this case, see Timothy M. Reynolds, Tenth Circuit, Indian
Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 977,996-1002 (1998).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
3. 50 F.3d. 1530 (10th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Colorado & Eastern, see Cameron R.
Getto, Tenth Circuit Survey, EnvironmentalLaw, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 753 (1996).
4. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 154-36.
5. Indeed, the court in Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc. commented, "For the third time in as
many years, we are faced with the task of further defining and clarifying the relationship between §§
107 and 113 of [CERCLA]." 124 F.3d 1187, 1188 (10th Cir. 1997).
6. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
7. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
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I. CERCLA COST RECOVERY AND CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS

A. Background
CERCLA is one of the most powerful and expansive environmental
statutes ever legislated! It is designed to provide for prompt cleanup of
contaminated sites, or sites that are threatened with contamination from
the release of hazardous substances The power of CERCLA lies in the
fact that individuals or corporations may be held entirely liable for these
expensive cleanups.'" CERCLA authorizes the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to rehabilitate contaminated sites either
by using Superfund monies," or by ordering any responsible person to
perform the cleanup." If EPA cleans the site, it may still seek recovery of
its costs by bringing a section 107 "cost recovery" suit against any person deemed liable under that section.'3 To attach personal liability, the
EPA need only show that the party is a past or current owner of the contaminated site, or a person who arranged for hazardous substances to be
disposed at, or transported to, the contaminated site."' Anyone belonging
to this group of potentially liable persons is known as a potentially responsible party (PRP). Since CERCLA sites often have a complex history of ownership and waste disposal, there may be a large number of
PRPs for each site.'"
Although legislative history reveals that Congress expressly avoided
delineating CERCLA liability as strict, and joint and several,'6 courts
quickly agreed that liability for cleanup costs incurred by the government
was both strict,'7 and joint and several'8 unless a defendant could prove

8. There are currently over 1,200 sites listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). 40 C.F.R.
pt. 300 (1997). In 1994 the average cost of CERCLA cleanup was estimated at $40 million per site.
Steven Ferrey, Allocation and Uncertainty in the Age of Superfund: The Redistribution of CERCLA
Liability, 3 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 36, 37 (1994).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. I, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6119-20.
10. SeeCERCLA§ 111,42U.S.C. §9611 (1994).
I1. See id. (governing the use of Superfund).
12. See CERCLA §§ 104(a), 106(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9606(a) (1994).
13. See CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1994).
14. See CERCLA § 107(a)(l)-(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4)(A) (1994)
15. See, e.g., Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1189 (10th Cir. 1997)
(involving a contaminated landfill site where the EPA identified dozens of companies that had used
the site to dispose of hazardous substances).
16. For a discussion of Congress's intent to allow courts to determine CERCLA liability, see
Cathleen Clark, Comment, Should the Butcher, the Baker and the Candlestick Maker Be Held
Responsiblefor Hazardous Waste?, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 871, 877-80 (1994).
17. A close reading of the statute supports this interpretation; section 107(a) attaches liability
to owners, operators, arrangers, and transporters without regard to causation and provides for only
limited defenses in section 107(b). CERCLA § 107(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a), (b) (1994).
18. Under CERCLA's joint and several liability provision, one defendant may be held liable
for the entire cost of cleanup, regardless of its fair share, or that other parties are known to have
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divisible harm.'9 This, however, is often very difficult to prove.' As a
result, this joint and several liability can cause gross inequities because
one party may be singled out and held responsible for all of the cleanup
costs even though it disposed of only a small fraction of the hazardous
substances at the site.2'
To mitigate the harshness of CERCLA liability, courts implied a
right of contribution for parties responsible for cleanup costs22 from other
responsible parties.' In 1986, when Congress re-authorized CERCLA, it
expressly provided for the right of contribution in section 113."2 Far from
quieting all controversy, section 113 has become the source of much
confusion and divergent opinion;' it may be the greatest source of litigation in CERCLA cases. 6
CERCLA initially only provided for cost recovery under section
107, which provides that any PRP shall be liable for "all cost of removal
or remedial action incurred by the United States Government ... [and]
any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person...
. Section 107 liability is strict, and joint and several." Under section
contributed to the contamination. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 810-11
(S.D. Ohio 1983).
19. Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes only where there are
distinct harms, or a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause to a single harm.
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding
that even though defendant's waste contained levels of hazardous waste below naturally occurring
background levels, defendant could not prove the harm was divisible when its waste commingled
with the hazardous waste of other contributors). But see United States v. Bell Petroleum Servs., 64
F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding harm was divisible where a single hazardous substance,
chromium, entered a sealed aquifer as the result of similar operations by three parties at mutually
exclusive times; harm was proportionate to the volume of chromium-contaminated water each had
discharged into the environment).
21. United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (10th Cir. 1995). Under
joint and several liability, the EPA can collect all the cleanup costs (including any insolvent PRPs'
share, known as "orphan shares") from any single PRP. Thus, the EPA need only find one "Fortune
500" company to ensure recovery of all cleanup costs at a site. William D. Evans Jr., The "Road
Warrior" Quality of Superfund Contribution Litigation, 32 TENN. BUS. J. 26, 28 (1996).
22. Contribution under CERCLA provides equitable apportionment, whereby a party is
entitled to relief from other PRPs to the extent that it can demonstrate the divisibility of harm and
that it paid more than its fair share. Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1535-36.
23. David L Bearman, Note, CERCLA--Cost Recovery, Contribution and Statutes of
Limitations: Working Toward a Solution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 149, 154 (1996); see, e.g., Colorado
v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that the right to contribution
under a federal statute may arise in either of two ways: through the creation of a right of action by
Congress expressly, or by clear implication; or through the power of the federal courts to fashion a
federal common law of contribution).
24. CERCLA § 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1) (1994).
25. See Evans, supra note 21, at 29-30. The split appears to be mostly at the trial court level.
Among the circuit courts that have addressed the issue, all have held that actions for reapportionment
of costs between PRPs are ones for contribution. Id.
26. Id.
27. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
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113, however, contribution actions are governed by equitable factors.'
For this reason, a liable PRP would clearly prefer to recover the costs of
cleanup from other PRPs under the provisions of section 107 rather than
section 113, since joint and several liability would allow the liable party
to recover the full cost of the cleanup, not just the amount paid in excess
of its equitable share." Section 107 provides an additional benefit in the
form of a six year limitations period, whereas contribution claims are
generally barred after three years."
Despite the "any other person" language in section 107, liable PRPs
attempting to use the section 107 "cost recovery" provision have generally not been allowed to do so. 2 The Tenth Circuit addressed this issue in
United States v. Colorado & Eastern Railroad," concluding that any
claim reapportioning costs between PRPs is the "quintessential claim for
contribution," and thus governed by section 113."
Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases have held that, in a contribution
action, the liability of a defendant must first be determined according to
the categories set forth in section 107 (owners, operators, arrangers, and
transporters) before apportionment can be determined by equitable factors." The Tenth Circuit decisions build upon this important point to answer the more specific question: which costs are recoverable in a contribution suit. 6
The Tenth Circuit also recently considered the statute of limitations
period that should apply to contribution suits brought by PRPs incurring

28. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
29. See United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995).
Courts may consider several equitable factors when apportioning costs, known collectively as the
"Gore factors" after an unsuccessful amendment to CERCLA offered by then-Congressman Al
Gore.
The Gore factors include 1)the ability of the parties to demonstrate that their contribution
can be distinguished, 2) the amount. of hazardous substance involved, 3) the degree of
toxicity of the hazardous substance, 4) the degree of involvement by the parties in
generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal, 5) the degree of care exercised
by the parties taking into account the characteristics of the hazardous substance, and 6)
the degree of cooperation by the parties with government officials to prevent harm.
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 367 (2d
ed. 1996).
30. A section 107 cost recovery claim allows recovery for all necessary response costs, while
contribution allows only for reapportionment of costs where it is possible to determine each party's
fair share of the harm caused using equitable factors such as the Gore factors. Colorado & Eastern,
50 F.3d at 1536.
31. CERCLA § I 13(g)(2)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)-(3) (1994).
32. In the Tenth Circuit, see Colorado & Eastern, 50 F.3d at 1530.
33. Id. at 1536.
34. Id. For a discussion of the distinction between cost recovery claims and contribution
claims, see Getto, supranote 3,at 755.
35. "Recovery of response costs by a private party under [CERCLA] is a two-step process."
Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, 100 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 1996).
36. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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costs due to compliance with section 106 administrative orders, 7 instead
of as a result of settlements (consent decrees)" with, or cost recovery
suits by, the EPA.39 The issue arises because the limitations period that
section 1 13(g)(3) provides for in contribution actions sets forth four specific triggers, none of which occur when a PRP begins cleanup in response to a section 106 administrative order, and later seeks contribution
from other PRPs. '
No other circuit court has considered this question."' The First Circuit did suggest in a footnote the possibility of a PRP who "spontaneously initiates" a cleanup (the so-called "innocent PRP") pursuing a cost
recovery claim under section 107.2 The court declined to rule on the
limitations issue; rather, it cautiously noted that "it is unclear to us
whether such a cause of action would be subject to the three-year or the
six-year prescriptive period."' 3 The court, however, believed that situations existed where a PRP might bring a cost recovery (section 107) action instead of a contribution (section 113) action, and thus receive a six
year limitations period. In the Tenth Circuit, however, that possibility
may not exist because of the court's holding in Colorado & Eastern that
limits a PRP to a section 113 contribution suit when seeking to recover
costs of cleanup."
Although the circuit courts have not considered the statute of limitations period directly, several district courts have recently held that parties complying with a section 106 administrative order did not trigger the
three year statute of limitations for contribution actions.'3 Such parties

37. Section 106 of CERCLA provides that the President may issue such orders as necessary to
protect public health, welfare, and the environment where contamination of the environment by
hazardous substances is found to be an imminent and substantial public or environmental
endangerment. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1994). This authority has been largely
delegated to the EPA, which may issue an administrative order or obtain an order from a federal
district court. Id.
38. Section 122 of CERCLA allows the EPA to enter into settlement agreements, known as
consent degrees, with PRPs to facilitate the cleanup of contaminated sites. CERCLA § 122(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9622(a), (d) (1994).
39. See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
40. "[N]o action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced more
than three years after" the date of any action for the recovery of costs, or the date of a consent decree
or judicially approved settlement. CERCLA § I13(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (1994).
41. Search of Westlaw database (December, 1997). See Aaron A. Garber, Note, The PRP, the
Section 106 Administrative Order, the Contribution Claim, and CERCLA's Statute of Limitations: A
Complete Statutory Analysis, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 115, 116-17 (1997).
42. United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 99 n.8 (1st Cir. 1994).
43. Id.
44. United States v. Colorado & Eastem R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1539 (10th Cir. 1995). Colorado
& Eastern may be distinguished, however, because in that case, the PRP seeking contribution had
been found liable under section 107, whereas in United Tech., the PRP's liability had not been
proven.
45. See Gould, Inc. v. A & M Battery & Tire Serv., 901 F. Supp. 906 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Ekotek
Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 881 F. Supp. 1516 (D. Utah 1995); Reichhold Chem., Inc. v. Textron, Inc.,
888 F. Supp. 1116 (N.D. Fla. 1995); seealso Garber,supra note 41, at 116-17.
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may have an indefinite period of time in which to bring a contribution
claim. ' For example, the court in Ekotek Site PRP Committee v. Self relied on the plain language of the statute, and the equitable argument that
a PRP entering into an administrative order with the EPA does not know
its total liability for the cleanup. The court concluded that it would be
unfair to commence the statute of limitations period for a contribution
claim before ascertaining the party's liability.'
B. Tenth CircuitCases
1. Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, Inc."
a. Facts
Bancamerica owned an industrial site found to be heavily contaminated with lead and other hazardous substances.' The site had several
previous owners and operators, ' including ASARCO, who owned and
operated a lead smelter at the site from 1899 to 1902.' From 1907 to
1984, nonparties to the suit operated a steel fabrication facility on the
site. 2 In 1984, Bancamerica purchased the site, whereupon it was immediately leased to Trinity Industries, a subsidiary of Mosher Steel. 3 Trinity
used large amounts of lead-based paints and solvents at the site until the
lease was canceled in 1987.' Upon termination of the lease, Bancamerica
discovered that the site was heavily contaminated with lead originating
from lead smelter ash left by ASARCO, and lead-based paint left by th&
nonparties and Trinity."
In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entered into a
settlement with Bancamerica that required the latter to begin cleanup of
the site.' In 1991, the EPA issued an administrative order 7 under
CERCLA section 106 to ASARCO, which required it to assist in the
cleanup.' Bancamerica and ASARCO completed the cleanup and later
filed suit seeking contribution from Trinity under CERCLA section 113."
The district court held Trinity partially responsible for the contamination
46. Garber, supra note 41, at 116-17.
47. Ekotek, 881 F. Supp. at 1523.
48. 100 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 1996).
49. For a detailed summary of the facts, see Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Trinity Indus.,
900 F. Supp. 1427, 1435-50 (D. Kan. 1995).
50. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 795.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See supra note 33.
58. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 795.
59. Id.
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and ordered it to reimburse Bancamerica and ASARCO $555,293 for
cleanup expenses attributable to its conduct.'
b. Decision
Bancamerica and ASARCO appealed the decision, claiming that the
district court erred by refusing to grant prejudgment interest.' Additionally, Bancamerica argued that the court erred by solely considering toxicity and volume to allocate responsibility and liability for cleanup of the
lead contamination.' Trinity also raised several issues on appeal, including: 1) whether EPA orders required Bancamerica and ASARCO to
meet the public comment requirements of the national contingency plan
(NCP),' and 2) whether Bancamerica was entitled to recover the costs it
incurred in 1988 and 1989, prior to entering into a settlement with EPA."
Trinity claimed that Bancamerica and ASARCO did not comply
with provisions in the EPA orders that stated all required actions must be
undertaken in accordance with applicable federal laws. Trinity argued
that under these provisions, Bancamerica and ASARCO were required to
comply with the NCP regulations that established public comment requirements.'
In affirming the district court's ruling that the orders did not require
Bancamerica and ASARCO to comply with the NCP's public comment
requirements, the Tenth Circuit relied on an NCP provision stating,
"[a]ny response action carried out in compliance with the terms of an
order issued by [EPA] pursuant to section 107 of [CERCLA] ...will be
considered consistent with the [NCP]. ' '"7 The court also noted that in
drafting the 1990 contingency plan, the EPA required section 106 orders
to contain the cleanup standards necessary to maintain consistency with
the NCP."
Trinity claimed an additional error was made by the district court in
its failure to determine whether the cleanup was a "removal" or "reme-

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. id. at 795-96.
63. The national contingency plan requires private parties engaged in cleanup to provide the
general public an opportunity to comment on the selection of the response action. 40 C.F.R. §§
300.415(n), 300.430(f)(3) (1997). See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th
Cir. 1991).
64. This issue was decided in favor of Bancamerica, because Trinity failed to raise it with the
district court. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 798.
65. The president is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1994) to establish NCP procedures and
standards for cleaning up contaminated sites. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1997).
66. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 796.
67. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(ii) (1997).
68. See 55 Fed. Reg. 8666, 8797-98 (1990) (stating that section 106 orders governing private
persons might not contain all of the public participation requirements of the NCP).
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dial" action.' Trinity claimed this was necessary before the court could
decide whether the cleanup was consistent with the NCP. ° The argument
was rendered irrelevant, however, by the court's earlier holding that actions performed in accordance with section 106 orders are consistent
with the NCP."
Bancamerica and ASARCO contended the district court erred in
refusing to grant them prejudgment interest on those response costs for
which the court held Trinity liable.'2 They asserted that CERCLA section
107 mandates the award of such interest." Trinity countered with the
argument that Bancamerica and ASARCO's claim for contribution was
properly brought under section 113, not section 107, and that section 113
does not provide for the award-of prejudgment interest.' The court, however, interpreted CERCLA as requiring an award of prejudgment interest
in both section 113 and section 107 actions. 5
In reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed the differences between a section 107 cost recovery claim and a section 113 contribution
claim; it then decided that Bancamerica and ASARCO had asserted section 113 contribution claims because their actions were for cost apportionment between PRPs. 76 The court reasoned that any section 113 claim
must, by necessity, incorporate the liabilities established in section 107."
The court noted that recovery of response costs by a private party under
CERCLA is a two-step process. Initially, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant is liable under section 107(a). Once that is accomplished, the
question is the portion of the response costs for which each defendant
will be responsible under section 113.8
Section 107(a) states "[t]he amounts recoverable in an action under
this section shall include interest on the amounts recoverable under subparagraphs (A) through (D)."'9 Even though section 107 apparently refers
only to "actions under this section," the court reasoned that because a
section 113 contribution claim necessarily incorporates the liability pro-

69. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), (24) (1994). CERCLA distinguishes a removal as a short-term and
immediate response, while a remedial action may involve additional or different steps consistent
with a permanent remedy.
70. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 796. The NCP's regulations governing remedial actions are
more stringent than those governing removal actions. Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck,
840 F. Supp. 470,475 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
71. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 797.
72. Id. at 799.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 800.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 934-36 (8th Cir. 1995)).
79. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994)).
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visions of section 107, "a § 113(f) action for contribution is an action
under § 107."
To grant prejudgment interest is consistent with logic and policy,
the court asserted, because to do otherwise would result in parties undertaking cleanup "losing the time value of money they spent on behalf
of other liable persons, [while] those persons will have gained an equal
amount."'" Thus, it would create incentive for private parties to undertake
cleanup actions later, rather than sooner, since they would gain the time
value of money by delaying. 2 The court noted that this holding was consistent with other decisions." The court also determined that Bancamerica and ASARCO were both entitled to prejudgment interest because they satisfied the section 107(a) requirement that a demand for
payment be made in writing."
Bancamerica and ASARCO next argued that the district court erred
in considering only toxicity and volume when allocating liability for the
site's lead contamination. The court of appeals started with section
1 13(f)(1): A court "may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate."'" It
further stated that when considering reapportionment, "a court may consider several factors, a few factors, or only one determining factor...
depending on the totality of the circumstances presented to the court."
The court found no error in the district court's consideration of only the
factors of volume and toxicity when allocating liability. 7

80.

Id. at 801.

81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Bell Petroleum Servs. Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 908 (5th Cir. 1993)

(noting that 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)( 4 ) expressly provides for prejudgment interest); Browning-Ferris
Indus. v. Ter Maat, 1996 WL 67216, at *5 (N.D. IIl. Feb. 16, 1996) (noting the express language of
42 U.S.C. § 9607, and citing Bell Petroleum).

84. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 801. Section 107(a) states: "interest shall accrue from the later
of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the
expenditure concerned." CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994). Bancamerica
satisfied the writing requirement with a letter sent to Trinity stating that it had incurred $45,818 for
environmental work performed on the site, and that it believed Trinity to be liable for these costs.
Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 801. ASARCO satisfied the written demand requirement when it filed the
third amended complaint notifying Trinity that it had incurred costs "in excess of $1 million," for
which it was seeking reimbursement. Id.
85. Bancamerica,100 F.3d at 802; CERCLA § 113(0(1), 42 U.S.C. 9613(0)(1) (1994).
86. Bancamerica, 100 F.3d at 802-03 (quoting United States v.Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50
F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1996)).
87. Id. at 803.
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9
2. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc."

a. Facts
In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., a site became
contaminated with oil sludge as a result of the operation of a waste-oil
reclamation business by tenants on the Glenn Wynn site, part of a larger
refinery near Tulsa, Oklahoma. 9 Atlantic Richfield Company (ARCO)
acquired part interest in the site in 1969, which it sold in 1987.' In 1986,
the area was identified as a Superfund site requiring excavation and offsite thermal destruction of the sludge.9 '
The EPA and ARCO negotiated a settlement under which ARCO
agreed to undertake cleanup of the site and to pay the EPA's response
and future oversight costs relating to implementation of that remedy.'
The site was cleaned up by 1993, after which ARCO brought consolidated contribution actions against other PRPs, including companies
whose waste oil had been delivered to the site. 3 These defendants stipulated to liability for their proportionate share of the costs of cleaning up
the site, but argued that ARCO was not entitled to recover the attorney's
fees it incurred in negotiating the settlement, nor the costs of EPA's
oversight of the cleanup. '
The district court determined that ARCO could not recover litigation attorney's fees, but could recover those fees it incurred negotiating
the consent decree. 9 It also allowed ARCO to recover the costs it paid to
EPA for overseeing the cleanup according to the terms of the
settlement.' The defendants appealed the court's ruling on recovery of
oversight costs, and ARCO cross-appealed the court's failure to award
attorney's fees incurred in locating PRPs, and the court's apportionment
of fees paid to the settlement judge."
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed that ARCO was entitled to recover its
payment of the EPA's oversight costs, holding that they were part of
"response" costs for which PRPs are liable under CERCLA section 107,
and may be reapportioned among PRPs in a section 113 contribution
88. 98 F.3d 564 (10th Cir. 1996).
89. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 566. The waste-oil reclamation business was operated from
1964 to mid-1982.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 555.
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suit." The court, however, reversed the holding that allowed recovery of
attorney's fees incurred by ARCO in negotiating the settlement. ' The
court noted that nonlitigation attorney's fees were recoverable, but disallowed ARCO's cross-appeal for attorney's fees incurred in locating
°
PRPs because ARCO had not raised the issue during trial." The court
also affirmed the district court's ruling that ARCO and the collective
defendants should each pay 50% of the settlement judge's expenses. '
In ruling that EPA oversight costs were recoverable in contribution
claims under section 113, the court of appeals explained that a liable
party may seek contribution from any other PRP who is found liable under section 107."m Since section 107 establishes the liability of a PRP and
section 107(a)(4)(B) provides that PRPs are liable for any other neces°
sary cost of remedial action incurred by any other person," the court
examined the definition of remedial action to determine if it included
oversight costs.'"'
Section 101(24) defines remedial actions as "those actions consistent with permanent remedy ... [and] the term includes any monitoring
reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health
and welfare and the environment."'" Using the ordinary meaning of
monitoring-to regulate or oversee-the court found that government
oversight of private party cleanup efforts was synonymous with monitoring, and necessary to "protect the public health, welfare, and environment."'"m Thus, the cost of oversight was recoverable. 7
The defendants argued that the Third Circuit, in United States v.
Rohm & Haas Co.,"m had found that oversight costs were not costs of
removal and, therefore, not recoverable under section 107 ." Calling the
decision questionable,"' the Tenth Circuit noted that most of the district

98.
99.
100.

Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.

101. Id. at 571-72.
102. Id. at 567.
103. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
104. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 569.
105. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1994)).
106. Id. at 570.
107. Id. at 569-70.
108. 2F.3d 1265, 1271 (3d Cir. 1993).
109. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1271. The court relied on a Supreme Court opinion, Skinner v.
Mid-America Pipeline Co., that stated "Congress must indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the
Executive the discretionary authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the
benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens, whether characterized as 'fees'
or 'taxes' on those parties." 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989). In Rohm & Haas, the court concluded that the
costs incurred by the government were administrative costs not inuring directly to the benefit of that
party, but rather to the public at large. Rohm & Haas, 2 F.3d at 1273.
110. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 568.
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courts outside the Third Circuit had declined to follow it."' It also found
that the Third Circuit had only held that oversight costs were not a "removal" action." 2 The Tenth Circuit noted that the definition of remedial
action, at issue in Atlantic Richfield, was much broader than that of removal action, and clearly allowed recovery of government oversight
costs in private party remedial actions."'
The court next held that nonlitigation attorney's fees necessary to
the cleanup (such as the cost of locating other PRPs) were recoverable.""
The court refused to award ARCO the costs of locating PRPs, however,
because it had failed to raise the issue at trial."' The court also declined
ARCO's appeal that, as a prevailing party, ARCO should be awarded its
share of the fees and expenses it paid to the settlement judge."6 The court
deferred to the district court's ruling that ARCO and the defendants
should share these expenses equally, since each side benefited from those
services."7
3.

Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris,Inc."8'
a. Facts

In Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris,Inc., the contaminated site
was an abandoned limestone quarry operated as a landfill in which hazardous materials were disposed, and later seeped into the soil and water
surrounding the site."9 The EPA placed the site on the National Priority
List (NPL)'" and identified Sun Company as a PRP because it had con111. Id.; see, e.g., Town of New Windsor v. Tesa Tuck, 935 F. Supp. 317, 324-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); California v. Celtor Chemical Corp., 901 F. Supp. 1481, 1489-90 (N.D. Cal. 1995); see also
Patrick M. Flynn, Comment, Government Recovery of Superfund Cleanup Oversight Costs: A
Critiqueof United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 789 (1995).
112. Atlantic Richfield, 98 F.3d at 568-69.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 571 (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 919 (1994) (finding
that attorney's fees incurred in identifying other potentially responsible parties are recoverable as a
necessary cost of response)).
115. Id. ARCO claimed it did not raise the issue at trial because it thought the court's pretrial
ruling had precluded it from so doing. The court of appeals, however, ruled that the district court's
ruling did not prevent ARCO from raising the issue. The court had simply found that litigation fees
were not recoverable, while nonlitigation fees necessary to the cleanup were. Id.
116. Id. at 571-72. ARCO argued that the judge was a special master, and as a prevailing party,
ARCO was entitled to an award of its share as part of its costs. The court ruled that under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a), district courts have discretion to apportion the compensation of a
special master among the parties. The district court reasoned that both sides benefited from the
services of the settlement judge. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding
each side should pay half the costs incurred. Id. at 572.
117. Id.
118. 124F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 1997).
119. For a detailed summary of the facts, see Sun Co. (R & M) v. Browning-Ferris,Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 1523, 1527-28 (N.D. Okla. 1996).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(e) (1994) authorizes the EPA to identify and rank contaminated
hazardous waste sites. The worst sites are listed in the NPL at 40 C.F.R. part 300, app. B (1997).

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

19981

tributed hazardous waste to the site.'2' After attempts to negotiate a consent decree failed, the EPA issued a unilateral administrative order pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA'22 compelling Sun to pay for the costs of
remediation.'" Sun completed remediation and incurred $6.2 million in
cleanup costs.'' It was then able to identify other PRPs, and brought section 107 cost recovery, and section 113 contribution, claims against these
PRPs.' The defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment.
b. Decision
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the section 107 claim, holding that Sun's claim was for an
equitable apportionment, and was therefore a contribution claim under
section 113.'" The court of appeals affirmed,"7 leaving the length of the
limitations period that should be applied to the contribution suit to be
determined." Section 113(g)(3) provides a three-year limitation period
for contribution suits brought after any action for recovery of costs, or a
settlement concerning the cleanup, has occurred.'" Sun, however, undertook cleanup action in response to a section 106 administrative order,
there was no settlement or civil action prior to this suit."' As a result,
none of the triggering events provided for in section 113(g)(3) had occurred before Sun brought its suit for contribution.' 3'
The district court found that this anomaly was the result of an inadvertent omission on the part of Congress, and thus turned to another area
of federal contribution law to hold that Sun's cause of action had accrued
when it paid more than its equitable share of the cleanup 3costs.' As a
result, most of Sun's contribution claims were time-barred.' 3

121.
122.
necessary
123.
124.

Sun, 124F.3dat 1189.
CERCLA § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (1994), authorizes the EPA to issue such orders as
to protect public health, welfare and the environment from imminent endangerment.
Sun, 124F.3dat 1189.
Id.

125. Id.
126. Id. The court cited United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th
Cir. 1995). For a discussion of Colorado & Eastern relating to cost recovery and contribution
actions see supra notes 29, 30, and accompanying text.
127. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1190.
128. Id.
129. CERCLA § 113(g)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9 613(g)(3) (1994) provides a three year limitations
period for actions that commence after judgment in any action under section 9613 (contribution
actions for recovery of such costs or damages, or an administrative order under section 9622(g), and
de minimus settlements, or section 9622(h) (cost recovery settlements), or entry of a judicially
approved settlement with respect to such costs and damages.
130. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1190.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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The court of appeals, however, found that the district court had
erred by importing other contribution law into its decision."' Instead,
CERCLA section 113(g)(2) was applicable because no civil action or
settlement had commenced."' Therefore, Sun's contribution claim was an
"initial action" for recovery of costs that was governed by a six year
limitations period under section 11 3(g)(2).'36
Browning-Ferris argued that section 113(g)(2) should apply only to
section 107 cost recovery actions that are governed by strict, and joint
and several liability, and thus not available to Sun as a PRP seeking contribution. 7 The court of appeals rejected this argument. It noted that although section 113(g)(2) is subtitled "Actions for recovery of costs," and
refers only to actions within section 107, the Bancamerica'' opinion established that a section 113(f) action for contribution is an action under
section 107.' 3' Because no settlements had been entered into, and previous actions for the site had been filed under section 107, Sun's action for
equitable apportionment was an "initial action" for the recovery of such
costs.'" The court found that this interpretation gave meaning to each
provision of section 113(g) and was not inconsistent with Congress' intent to provide a three year limitations period for contribution actions
filed after the four events enumerated in section 113(g)(3). The court
reasoned that if the contribution suit was not an initial action, then a previous action must have been filed, thus one of the triggering events in
section 113(g)(3) would have occurred, and the three year limitations
period would be invoked. 2
The court made it clear that the statutory language permits two types
of contribution actions, governed by different statutes of limitations.'3
First, if a PRP incurs its cleanup costs pursuant to a civil action under
section 106, section 107, or a resulting settlement, the PRP has three
years from the date of judgment or settlement in which to bring its contribution claim. Second, if the PRP incurred its cleanup costs in some
other way, such as responding to an EPA order rather than a court order,
the PRP has six years from the start of remediation in which to bring suit.
The court noted, however, that it left undecided whether PRPs who assert

134. Id.
135. Id. at 1192.
136. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2) (1994) provides: "An initial action for recovery of costs
referred to section 9607 must be commenced . . . (B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after
initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action ....(emphasis added).
137. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1192.
138. Bancamerica Commercial Corp. v. Mosher Steel, 100 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 1996).
139. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1192.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1192-93.
142. Id. at 1193.
143. Id. (citing Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994) ("recognizing two
'similar and somewhat overlapping' contribution actions under sections 107 and 113")).
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their innocence with regard to any waste at a site may be able to recover
all of their costs from other PRPs in an action under section 107."
C. Other Circuits
Most circuits that have addressed this issue agree that an action between PRPs is one for contribution and thus governed by equitable factors, not strict, and joint and several liability. " For example, in Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp.,' the Ninth Circuit reversed a
district court decision to deny the defendant's motion to dismiss claims
brought by a PRP seeking to recover the totality of response costs from
other PRPs under joint and several liability.' The court acknowledged
that bringing a contribution claim necessarily involves establishing the
defendant's liability under section 107, but still found that recovery is
governed by equitable apportionment under section 113, not the joint and
several liability provisions of section 107.'
The Seventh Circuit, however, has made an exception to the rule that
claims by one PRP against another must normally be brought as contribution claims under section 113. In Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner
Corp.,'4 the court recognized that a PRP may bring a section 107 cost
recovery claim if it is not responsible for any of the contamination." The
Seventh Circuit later clarified that the exception applies in cases where it
is factually uncertain whether the PRP is partially responsible for contaminating the site. In Rumpke, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 5 the court
held that the owner of a recently acquired landfill (a PRP under
CERCLA section 107(a)(1)) alleging that it did not pollute the site could
initially bring a section 107 cost recovery action against defendant
PRPs If the facts establish that the owner was partially responsible for
the contamination, however, that owner may only proceed in a claim for
contribution.5 The Third Circuit has also held that section 107 cost recovery claims may be brought by innocent parties that have undertaken
cleanups.'" Other courts have acknowledged that a class of cases might
exist in which a PRP might sue under section 107, but have yet to rule on

144. Sun, 124 F.3d at 1191 n.1.
145. Jose R. Allen & Karen L. Peterson, Private Party Litigation Under Superfund: Claims for
Cost Recovery and Contribution, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 663, 674 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, June 23, 1997); see, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496
(11th Cir. 1996); United Tech. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96, 101-03 (1st Cir. 1994);
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th Cir. 1989).
146. 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997).
147. Pinal Creek, 118 F.3d at 1306.
148. Id. at 1305-06.
149. 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994).
150. Akzo, 30 F.3d at 763.
151. 107 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1997).
152. Rumpke, 107 F.3d at 1241-42.
153. Id. at 1241.
154. New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997).
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the issue.'" Most circuit courts have not addressed the issue of prejudgment interest.'- Some district courts, however, have awarded prejudgment interest for contribution claims.'5 '
With the exception of the Third Circuit, no other circuit court has
decided the issue of whether oversight costs are recoverable in private
party contribution suits.' The Fifth Circuit ruled that the government
may recover the cost of oversight from PRPs in a cost recovery action.'"
In United States v. Lowe, the court refused to follow the Third Circuit's
reasoning in Rohm & Haas, citing Atlantic Richfield with approval."w
The Fifth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit's interpretation that
CERCLA provides for recovery of any costs incurred as part of remedial
action, including any "monitoring" necessary to protect the public health
or environment.'6 ' Like the Tenth Circuit, the court found EPA oversight
akin to monitoring, and thus recoverable as a necessary response cost.'62
D. Analysis
The decisions in Bancamerica, Atlantic Richfield, and Sun reflect
the Tenth Circuit's interest in mitigating some of the harsh and inequitable consequences of CERCLA liability. These decisions provide incentive for private parties to undertake cleanup of hazardous waste sites
sooner rather than later. For instance, the court's decision in Bancamerica granting prejudgment interest for contribution claims is a logical attempt to reward parties who undertake cleanup before all PRPs are
identified. To withhold prejudgment interest would, as the court pointed
out, create a "perverse incentive" for PRPs to delay involvement in
cleanups because they gain the time value of the money that would otherwise be spent on the cleanup."
CERCLA can be unfair in its application because it allows a single
PRP to be held liable for the entire cost of cleaning up a contaminated
site to which there are potentially many contributors. Once the first PRP
is identified and found liable, CERCLA places the burden on this PRP,
rather than the EPA, to identify other PRPs and bring contribution ac-

155. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11 th Cir. 1996); United
Tech. v. Browning-Ferris Corp., 33 F.3d 96, 99-100 (1st Cir. 1994).
156. The Fifth Circuit, however, upheld the award of prejudgment interest in Bell Petroleum
Servs. Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 908 (5th Cir. 1993).
157. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter Maat, 1996 WL 67216 (N.D. 11.Feb. 16, 1996); Boeing
Co. v. Cascade Corp., 920 F. Supp. 1121, 1139 (D. Or. 1996).
158. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 568 (10th Cir. 1996).
159. United States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 1997).
160. Id. at 403-04.
161. Id. at 402-03; see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1994) (defining remedial action).
162. Id. at 401-03.
163. Bancamerica Commercial Co. v. Mosher Steel, Inc., 100 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 1996).
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tions for the apportionment of costs.'" If the initial PRP cannot recover
prejudgment interest, CERCLA imposes a penalty on the first PRP held
liable. This penalty is unnecessary and creates an incentive for a PRP to
conceal its connection to the site. A PRP that is held liable for the entire
cleanup cost is also penalized because, as determined in Key Tronic
Corp. v. United States,'" it may not recover the attorney's fees it incurred
to litigate the contribution action.'" Only nonlitigation costs, such as locating other PRPs, could be recovered.'"
The court's decision in Atlantic Richfield allowing a liable PRP to
recover the cost of EPA oversight from other PRPs in a contribution action ' " is also sensible. It mitigates the harshness of CERCLA liability,
while encouraging a careful and thorough cleanup effort. To hold otherwise would again enforce an arbitrary penalty against those PRPs that are
identified first, creating incentive for a PRP to hide its connection to a
site until other PRPs had been identified and charged with cleanup costs.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Sun is consistent with earlier holdings and CERCLA's goal of achieving an immediate response to hazardous substance releases because it encourages PRPs to undertake cleanup
actions without prompting from EPA. If a PRP knows it will have more
time to identify and bring suit against other PRPs, this may result in it
voluntarily undertaking cleanup actions sooner. PRPs will have less
hesitation to begin cleanup before other PRPs can be identified when
they have less fear of being time-barred from bringing contribution suits
in the future.
The Tenth Circuit has thus far been firm in holding cost recovery
claims may not be brought by PRPs-an action for apportionment between PRPs is the "quintessential claim for contribution.'" While the
First Circuit has responded to the inequity of CERCLA liability by allowing certain PRPs that have paid more than their fair share of cleanup
costs to bring section 107 cost recovery suits,'"° the Tenth Circuit has
refused to allow PRPs to bring cost recovery actions in any situation.'
Nevertheless, the court's decisions indicate a willingness to interpret
CERCLA's liability provisions favorably for PRPs that have incurred
more than their share of cleanup costs. The court's decision in Sun may
be an extreme example of this willingness.

164. Section 107 allows the EPA to hold any PRP liable for the entire cost of cleanup. Thus,
there is little incentive for the EPA to identify more than one solvent PRP.
165. 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
166. Key Tronic, 511 U.S. at818.
167. Id. at 820.
168. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 571 (10th Cir.).
169. United States v. Colorado & Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (1995).
170. Id. at 1539.
171. Id. There may still be room, however, under the Colorado & Eastern decision for the court
to find that certain "innocent" PRPs may bring a section 107 cost recovery action. See supra note 44.
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The holding in Sun is not necessarily intuitive. The district caurt's
assertion that the inapplicability of section 11 3(g)(3) (limitations period
for contribution claims) was merely a drafting oversight72' seems at least
equally plausible. This is a natural conclusion to draw from the fact that
section 113(g) (relating to limitations periods) is divided into separate
sections entitled "Actions for recovery of costs" (section 11 3(g)(2)) and
"Contribution" (section 11 3(g)(3))."' Thus, it seems likely that Congress
intended to have different limitations periods for contribution and cost
recovery claims. '
The Tenth Circuit's decision nevertheless promotes CERCLA's
goal of achieving the prompt cleanup of hazardous substance releases,
because it encourages responsible parties to undertake cleanup efforts
sooner rather than later. The court was constrained by its earlier holding
in Colorado & Eastern because Sun was clearly a responsible party, thus
a cost recovery claim was not available. Sun was also, however, a cooperative party in achieving CERCLA's goal of initiating prompt response
to the release of hazardous substances into the environment. The Tenth
Circuit wisely chose to reward, rather than penalize, such efforts without
compromising the distinction between cost recovery and contribution
suits.
Arguably, this decision goes too far by putting responsible parties
on par with those who are innocent or responsible, and who undertake
cleanup without any prodding from the government.'" Sun was neither an
innocent party, nor was its cleanup completely voluntary. In fact, it was
ordered by the EPA to begin cleanup after failing to reach a settlement."
There may be little difference between this sort of PRP and the PRP that
undertakes cleanup only after negotiating a settlement with EPA. It
seems clear that the PRP that is not proven liable, yet spontaneously undertakes cleanup without any government prodding, should be rewarded
more so than PRPs such as Sun. The court has not yet addressed this
issue. The court's decisions in Sun and Colorado & Eastern, however,
may not have left any room to further reward such a PRP." Despite this
defect, Sun is still a sensible decision because it mitigates the harsh effects of CERCLA liability on those PRPs underiaking cleanup efforts
with only a minimum of governmental prodding.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1189 (10th Cir. 1997).
CERCLA § I I3(g)(2)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g)(2)-(3) (1994).
See Garber, supra note 41, at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Sun Co. (R&M) v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 124 F.3d at 1189.
But see supra notes 44, 171.
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II. PROCEDURAL INJURY AS A BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING

A. Background
Standing is a constitutional doctrine of judicial restraint that has
only recently attained much vigor. ' Standing has three main requirements. First, the plaintiff must show an injury in fact which is concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.79 Generalized grievances shared
by all are not sufficient to meet this standard." Second, the plaintiff must
show a causal connection between the injury and the offending
conduct."' Finally, the injury must likely be redress by a favorable decision. In other words, the court must be able to provide a remedy that will
cure the injury.' 2
These requirements make it difficult to challenge government action
having diffuse impacts, or involving the cooperation of many agencies.
For example, a plaintiff desiring to challenge an agency decision for failure to follow the procedure prescribed in its organic statute may find it
difficult to show that failure to follow procedure will result in harm to a
concrete and particularized interest. If the plaintiff can show a concrete
injury fairly traceable to the agency's failure to follow procedure, redressability will still present a problem to the plaintiff because the only
remedy a court may provide-a court order to the agency to follow procedure-will not necessarily change the agency's final decision.
Standing is often a formidable barrier for plaintiffs desiring to challenge decisions made by federal agencies concerning the management of
public lands.' Many commentators believe that one Supreme Court decision in particular, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, " has narrowed environmental standing considerably' 5 and inhibits environmentalists' ability
to air their grievances in federal court." Standing analysis is difficult
178. "Standing" is a relatively new issue. By 1992, the Supreme Court had mentioned standing
in 117 cases; 109 of those cases occurred after 1965, and 55 cases occurred after 1985. Sunstein,
infra note 185, at 169.
179. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
180. The injury in fact test may be traced to Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Sunstein,
infra note 185, at 169.
181. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (citing Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
182. Id. at 560-61 (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
183. See, e.g., id. at 562-67 (holding that plaintiffs who had an interest in wildlife, and an
intention to visit the habitat of the Nile crocodile some time in the future, was not enough to confer
standing to challenge a decision by the Secretary of the Interior that might harm the endangered Nile
crocodile); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 887-89 (1990) (holding that
plaintiffs who used land in the "vicinity" of an area of some two million acres did not have standing
to challenge a Bureau of Land Management decision affecting only 4,500 acres within that area).
184. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
185. See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen's Suits, "Injuries," and
Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164-66 (1992).
186. Brian J. Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, I I J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 75, 91 (1995).
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under Lujan because the court tightened the requirements that plaintiff
must meet to show a justiciable environmental injury in most cases,
while alluding to relaxed standards for environmental injuries in other
cases.
Congress, however, has expressed an intent to create standing for a
large number of plaintiffs by including citizens' suit provisions in most
environmental regulatory laws, as well as the Administrative Procedure
Act.'5 ' These provisions generally provide that "any person aggrieved" by
agency action has the right to judicial review.' Prior to Lujan, many
courts had found standing for plaintiffs seeking to challenge procedural
violations in agency decision making, based on these citizen suit provisions."9 In Lujan, however, the Court made it clear that federal statutes
alone do not confer standing." Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
stated that standing is derived from Article III of the Constitution, and
may not be granted by Congress without violating the separation of powers doctrine.'9 Congress may lower any prudential standing barriers with
citizen's suit provisions, but may not lower constitutionally derived
standing requirements."
The Supreme Court, however, also recognized that Congress "may
enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which create [the
foundation of] standing, even though no injury would exist without the
statute.""'9 For example, under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), Congress mandated that federal agencies making certain management decisions must follow prescribed procedures, including public
participation, and examination of alternatives identified in an environ-

187. Sunstein, supra note 185, at 164-66; see 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
188. For example, section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act states "A person . . .
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702.
189. Roger Beers, Standing and Related Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 1, 14 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, June 26, 1995). This fact prompted
Justice Blackmun to dissent, arguing that the majority opinion "amounts to a slash and bum
expedition through the law of environmental standing." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606.
190. Lujan, 504 U.S at 576.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 577-78. Justice Scalia stated that standing is an essential element of the separation of
powers doctrine. To allow Congress to grant standing would be to "discard[] a principle fundamental
to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch." Id. at 576. This is essentially the
same view that Justice Scalia expressed in a 1983 law review article, in which he criticized cases
granting environmental standing. See Sunstein, supranote 185, at 163.
193. Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,617 n.3 (1973).
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mental impact statement (EIS).'" The violation of such procedures, such
as a failure to prepare an EIS, results in a procedural injury.'"
If an environmentalist plaintiff were allowed to substitute a procedural injury for injury in fact, the standing barriers to challenging an
agency's decision based on its failure to follow decision making procedures would largely disappear, because the injury and redressability requirements are more easily met when the injury is defined as procedural,
rather than factual." Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan made it
clear that a plaintiff may not substitute procedural injury for injury in
fact. " In a confusing and now famous'" footnote'" Justice Scalia acknowledged that procedural rights may afford a plaintiff special treatment under standing doctrine.'
Scalia wrote that "[t]here is much truth to the assertion that 'procedural rights' are special: The person who has been accorded a procedural
right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting
all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy."'" Footnote
seven, however, is confusing and raises more questions than it answers,
since the court did not apply the standards it set forth;' it did not apply
the standards because Lujan was not a procedural rights case.' Thus, the
lower courts are given the task of interpreting and applying the standards
it set forth.
Footnote seven did not expressly lower the injury in fact requirement.' Instead, Justice Scalia illustrated the dual standard for the requirement in a hypothetical involving the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA).' He wrote that "one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the
licensing agency's failure to prepare an [EIS], even though he cannot

194. NEPA requires agencies to consider the effects of their actions on the environment by
preparing a detailed EIS, which must include a discussion of alternative proposals. 42 U.S.C. § 4332
(c) (1994).
195. Kelly Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest of the Standing Doctrine: Challenging
Resource Management Plans in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK LJ. 223,
238 n.87 (1996).
196. See William M. Orr, Note & Comment, Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen: An Improper
Application of Lujan to a Procedural Rights Plaintiff, 15 PACE ENVrL. L. REV. 373, 375 (1997).
197. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572.
198. The procedural standing mentioned in Lujan is now sometimes referred to simply as
"footnote seven standing." Gatchel, supra note 186, at 91.
199. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
200. Gatchel, supra note 186, at 91.
201. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
202. Gatchel, supra note 186, at 108-09.
203. The Court expressly rejected the court of appeals finding of a procedural injury. Lujan,
504 U.S. at 572.
204. See id. at 572 n.7.
205. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994).
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establish with any certainty2 that the statement will cause the license to
be withheld or altered, and even though the dam will not be completed
for many years."' Thus, the hypothetical suggests that the actual harm
requirement of the injury in fact element may be satisfied by showing the
plaintiff's "geographical nexus" to the affected area. Indeed, lower
courts have generally held that a procedural injury must be accompanied
by a showing that the plaintiff regularly uses, or lives adjacent to, the site
of the challenged project.'
Justice Scalia argued that the "normal standards" for immediacy and
redressability need not be met in a procedural injury claim, but he did not
indicate whether these standards are eliminated or simply relaxed. 2'0 Examination of the hypothetical, however, suggests the immediacy requirement for procedural plaintiffs is virtually eliminated when plaintiffs
do not control the timing of the injury, such as in the case of the dam
scenario."' Some courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have dispensed with
the immediacy requirement after deciding that footnote seven applies. '2
Footnote seven is less clear about the redressability requirement.
The dam hypothetical might be simply one example where the facts met
a relaxed standard, or it might be interpreted to eliminate the standard
altogether. 3 If footnote seven means the former, then it begs the following question:
How distant or removed must an injury be before it is unre1
'
dressable?
Redressability and causation are closely related, and the plaintiff's
ability to satisfy both elements depends on how the injury is defined. For
example, if the injury is defined in terms of the government's failure to
follow the law-as is the case with statutes like NEPA, which prescribes
detailed procedures with which to make major federal land management
decisions-the causation and redressability requirements are easily met
in most cases.2 5 If the agency fails to follow a prescribed procedure, the
206. NEPA requires only that agencies prepare an EIS, when necessary, to consider the
alternatives to the proposed action, but does not mandate any particular decision to be made
following this consideration. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
225 (1980).
207. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
208. The term was first used by a court in relation to a procedural injury in City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 1975). Orr,supra note 196, at 380.
209. Id. at 380-81.
210. Gatchel, supra note 186, at 91-92.
211. Id. at 99.
212. Id. at 100.
213. Id. at 108.
214. See id.
215. This is the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit in Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v.
Lucero, 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996). The court devoted most of its analysis to the injury in fact
element. Id. at 448-51. Having established that the procedural injury shall be the foundation of the
injury in fact element, the court decided the causation and redressability requirements with much
less discussion. Id. at 451-52.
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injury is directly traceable to the federal agency, and can be redressed by
a court judgment that requires the agency to follow the prescribed procedure.
If the injury is defined in terms of the harm to the plaintiff's concrete interests, however, the plaintiff in a NEPA suit would be caught on
the familiar horns of not being able to show that its factual injury (e.g.,
environmental degradation caused by completion of the project in question) is "fairly traceable" to the agency's failure to prepare an EIS. 2 ' Nor
would the plaintiff be able to show that its injury is redressable because
the district court could not order the agency to make any particular decision regarding the project following consideration of the EIS.2"
Ambiguity arises because the determination of causation and redressability is critically related to how the injury is defined. Footnote
seven, however, does not clarify this relationship, nor does it even mention causation. Thus, the footnote does little more than affirm that a procedural injury claim does exist for claims brought under NEPA, without
articulating the reasons why.21' For this reason, it does not provide a
workable framework for evaluating procedural injuries that might be
recognized under other action-forcing statutes similar to NEPA, such as
the National Forest Management Act of 1976."9 Consequently, the lower
courts have taken slightly different paths in interpreting footnote seven
standing.' For example, the D.C. Circuit has distinguished cases in
which a plaintiff alleged injury stemming from broad programmatic decisions, from cases in which the plaintiff challenged an action directed at
a specific decision made.22 "The court imposed stricter requirements in
the former case.'
The Tenth Circuit, in Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero,m
clarified footnote seven and provided a workable procedural standing
analysis framework by defining injury in fact as a two part test." ' The test
216. See Sunstein, supra note 185, at 225.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994). The Act directs the Forest Service to develop land and resource
management plans ("forest plans") for each forest unit in the National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. §
1604 (1994).
220. Beers, supra note 189, at 14. Compare Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Endangered Species
Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that an environmental group had Article III standing
to challenge a decision of the Committee "if for no other reason than that they allege procedural
violations in an agency process in which they participated"), with Region 8 Forest Service Timber
Purchasers Council v. Alcock, 993 F.2d 800, 810 (11 th Cir. 1993) (denying standing to a council of
timber purchasers to challenge actions taken by the Forest Service because the injuries asserted by
the council to its rights to participation and informed decision-making were generalized grievances
that do not confer Article III standing).
221. Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see infra notes
267-72 and accompanying text.
222. FloridaAudubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 667.
223. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
224. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449.
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requires the plaintiff to prove 1) that the agency's failure to follow procedure results in increased environmental risk and 2) that its concrete
interests are harmed by that increased risk."2 Thus, in NEPA cases, the
injury in fact requirement will be met if the plaintiff can show a geographical nexus to an area that will be subjected to increased environmental risk due to an agency's uninformed decision making. The causation and redressability elements are then satisfied in terms of the procedural injury, rather than in terms of harm to the plaintiff's concrete interests. ' The court has yet to address the broader issue of procedural
standing for claims brought under statutes other than NEPA.m Nevertheless, as explained below, the court did present a workable procedural
injury framework under which plaintiffs may be able to use procedural
standing to challenge a broader range of land agency decisions.
B. Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucerom
1. Facts
Taos Ski Valley, which operates a ski area by permit within National Forest lands in New Mexico, proposed to expand the operation of
its facilities so as to include summertime use.' In considering the request, the Forest Service prepared an environmental assessmente ° in order to analyze the impact the proposed expansion would have on the environment. Based on the assessment, the Carson National Forest supervisor prepared a finding of no significant impact (FONSI)2 and approved
the proposed summertime expansions.2"
The Committee to Save the Rio Hondo (Committee) brought this
action claiming that the Forest Service had failed to follow NEPA procedures when it approved the ski area's summertime expansion." The ski
225. Id. at 449-51.
226. Id. at 45 i-52.
227. The Tenth Circuit decided one other case involving a procedural injury claim brought
under NEPA. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429
(10th Cir. 1996). This opinion contained a relatively brief discussion of the standing issue and did
not elaborate on the injury in fact test. Id. at 1433-34.
228. 102 F.3d 445 (10th Cir. 1996).
229. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 446.
230. Id. "An environmental assessment contains a less exhaustive environmental analysis than
does an environmental impact statement." Id. It is used by the agency to determine whether a full
EIS is necessary. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(b), (c), 1508.9 (1997).
231. The issuance of a FONSI is a finding that preparation of an EIS is not necessary. It is
usually the last NEPA action on a project. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13 (1997).
232. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 446.
233. The court stated:
The Committee claimed the Forest Service's approval of the amended master plan and
special use permit was either a 'major Federal (sic) action significantly affecting the ...
environment' requiring the Forest Service to prepare an environmental impact statement,
or the approval was a 'substantial change' to the plan, requiring the Forest Service to
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement.
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area moved to dismiss the Committee's claim for lack of standing. " In
response, the Committee filed affidavits from two of its members that
claimed they used and enjoyed the land and water surrounding the ski
area for recreation, and that their use and enjoyment would be damaged
by year-round operation of the ski area. 35
The district court found that the Committee lacked standing because
it had not shown either sufficient injury in fact, or redressability.' The
injury was too speculative because the Committee could not prove that
the agency's decision would change if proper NEPA procedure had been
followed." The court also found that the Forest Service had complied
with NEPA by completing an environmental assessment, and therefore,
that a favorable decision would not redress the Committee's injuries."
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the Committee's claim satisfied the prudential "zone of interests" test,239 and that it had also met all
three requirements of constitutional standing.2" The court began by acknowledging that a NEPA procedural injury may be the foundation for
injury in fact.' The court classified the injury in fact requirement as a
two-prong test: 2
[First,] the litigant must show that in making its decision without
following [NEPA] procedures, the agency created an increased risk of
actual, threatened, or imminent environmental harm; and [second] the
litigant must show that the increased risk of environmental harm injures its concrete interests by demonstrating either its geographical
nexus to, or actual use of the site of the agency action.,4

Id. at 447 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i-v) (1994) and 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (1995)).

234.

Id.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. NEPA requires only that alternatives be identified and considered, but does not
mandate any particular decision. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1980).
238. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 477. The court of appeals found the Committee's injury was
redressable but did not rule on the question of whether the Forest Service had already complied with
NEPA. Id. at 453.
239. The zone of interest is a fourth element of standing doctrine, however, it is judiciallycreated rather than based upon the Constitution. Bennet v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. 1154, 1161 (1997).
Because NEPA does not contain a private right of action, plaintiffs must rely on section 702 of the
Administrative Procedure Act to gain the right of judicial review. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 448. The
court found the Committee had properly alleged it was adversely affected by some final agency
action within the meaning of NEPA because the Committee sought to protect its recreational and
aesthetic interests in the land and water, and their alleged injuries fall within the zone of interests
that NEPA was designed to protect. Id.
240. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 448-52.
241. Id. at 449 (citing Douglas County v. Babbit, 48 F.3d 1495, 1499-1501 (9th Cir. 1995)).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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The court found that the plaintiff satisfied the first prong because increased environmental risk would result from the agency's uninformed
decision making.' The court determined that the second prong was satisfied because the Committee had showed that its members actually used
the area and, therefore, could show a risk of environmental harm to a
particularized and concrete interest."5
The court found that the Committee satisfied the causation requirement because the increased risk was "fairly traceable to the agency's
alleged failure to follow [NEPA] procedures."" The court then indicated
that the injury resulted not from the agency's decision, but from the
agency's uninformed decision making. 7 The court specifically rejected a
D.C. Circuit opinion holding that the test for causation required the
plaintiff to show a demonstrable risk to his particularized interests.'M The
Tenth Circuit indicated that this analysis confused the issue of the likelihood of the harm (better addressed in the injury in fact requirement) with
its cause."4 9 Whether an increased risk will or will not occur due to the
agency action determines whether a plaintiff has suffered injury in fact,
not causation.'
Because the injury was so defined, the court found that it would be
redressed by a favorable judgment."' "That the Forest Service may not
change its decision to allow summertime operations at the ski area after
preparing an [EIS] is immaterial.""2 What was important was that the
Committee had established that its injury would be redressed by a judgment requiring the Forest Service to comply with NEPA procedure."
C. Other Circuits
Given the Supreme Court's scant explanation of procedural standing
in Lujan,"4 it is not surprising that the lower courts have diverged when
interpreting standing requirements for procedural injury cases. The Ninth
Circuit has generally been enthusiastic in recognizing standing based on
footnote seven." In Douglas County v. Babbit,' that court granted
standing to the county to challenge the Secretary of the Interior's deci244. Id.
245. Id. at 451.
246. Id. at 452 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992)).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 451.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 454.
252. Id. at 452.
253. Id.
254. Lujan, 504 U.S.at 572.
255. Yumee A. Shim, Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Glickman: When a Tree Falls in
the Forest, Is Anything Left (of) Standing?, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 277, 295 (1996).
256. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995).
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sion to designate certain federal land as critical habitat for the Northern
Spotted Owl because the plaintiff showed that sufficient injury to concrete, particularized interests had a reasonable probability of
occurrence. 7 The court quoted the language of footnote seven, stating
that the normal standards of redressability and immediacy are relaxed."
It acknowledged the uncertainty of whether the plaintiff's concrete interests would be affected by the Secretary's decision to designate land as
critical habitat, but stated this concern was "not important." ' 9 Thus the
Ninth Circuit approach related the causation and redressability requirements to the plaintiff's concrete injury, but relaxed the standards for both
elements to one of "reasonable probability." 26°
The D.C. Circuit has taken both restrictive and expansive views of
footnote seven standing. In Moreau v. F.E.R.C.,6 1 the court held that the
plaintiff had standing to challenge the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's decision to build a pipeline, based on the agency's failure to
give the plaintiff proper notice of a public hearing regarding the construction. 62 The court noted that redressability of the plaintiff's injuries
would be highly unlikely,' 3 yet this was not fatal under the footnote
seven standard of redressability. ' Thus, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits applied a relaxed, but undefined, standard for causation and redressability
that relates the injury to the plaintiff's concrete interests. 5
The D.C. Circuit, however, has distinguished cases in which the
plaintiff alleged injury premised upon broad rulemaking, from cases in
which the plaintiff challenges an action at a particular location." In
FloridaAudubon Society v. Bentsen77 the court noted that the standard is
stricter in cases involving the former.2' Bentsen involved a challenge to
the Secretary of the Treasury's decision to expand a tax credit for ethanol
made from corn and other crops.2' 9 The plaintiff first argued that NEPA
required the secretary to prepare an EIS before making this decision.
Secondly, the tax credit would increase the production of crops, which
would cause environmental harm to land that the plaintiffs used."' The
court held that in this situation, standing required the plaintiff to show a
particularized, demonstrable injury, fairly traceable to the act of the

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1501.
Id.
Id.
Id. at n.6.
982 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir 1993),
Moreau, 982 F.2d at 567.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 567.
See Gatchel, supra note 186, at 102-06.
See Ott, supra note 196, at 390.
94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
FloridaAudubon Soc'y, 94 F.3d at 667.
Id. at 662.
Id.
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agency, and substantially probable to cause the injury."' By adding a
demonstrable injury requirement and refusing to relax the redressability
and causation requirements as suggested in footnote seven, the court
made it substantially more difficult for plaintiffs who challenge programmatic decisions, or decisions with diffuse impacts, to establish
standing. 2
D. Analysis
Footnote seven in Lujan made it clear, without articulating why, that
plaintiffs who use or live near land which is the site of a proposed project
that will be affected by an agency decision will have standing to force
the agency to follow proper NEPA procedure. 3 Thus, Rio Hondo was
not a difficult case to decide because its facts so closely paralleled the
hypothetical in footnote seven." ' Rio Hondo is important, however, because the court recognized a two-part test for procedural injury claims
like those brought under NEPA:2.. (1) The plaintiff must first establish
that the agency's failure to follow procedure will result in a procedural
injury that will affect its concrete interests; and (2) thereafter, the injury
will be defined in terms of procedural injury for purposes of immediacy,
redressability, and causation."6 This makes the injury in fact requirement
the most important element of environmental standing, because redressability and causation will be easily satisfied in most cases where the
agency that is required to follow procedure is a party to the case."
The court's interpretation, although logical, is not necessarily supported by a strict application of the language in footnote seven. The footnote suggests that a person who has been accorded a procedural right
through action-forcing statutes like NEPA, may enforce this right to
protect a concrete interest "without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy."" The Rio Hondo decision, however, applies normal standards, but applies them to the procedural injury, rather
than to the concrete interests injury.
Nothing in footnote seven or the majority opinion in Lujan suggests
that the immediacy and redressability standards should be applied to the
procedural injury. Indeed, there would be no need to discuss special
271. Id. at 666 (emphasis added).
272. See Orr, supra note 196, at 397-98.
273. See Sunstein, supra note 185, at 225.
274. Id.
275. Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 449 (10th Cir. 1996).
276. Id. at 451-52.
277. Redressability will be a problem in a relatively few number of cases where the agency that
must follow the procedure is not a party to th suit, as in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. See Gatchel,
supra note 186, at 97-98. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service was the agency that failed to
consult with the Secretary of the Interior, and it was not a party to the case. The district court could
order the agency to follow procedure only if it was a party to the case. Id.
278. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).

19981

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

standards for immediacy and redressability were this so. If the foundational injury is the procedural violation, the injury is suffered as soon as
the procedure is violated; furthermore, the harm is clearly redressable by
a court order to follow procedure. It only becomes necessary to lower the
redressability and immediacy standards when they are related to a factual
injury rather than a procedural injury.
Clearly, footnote seven is difficult to apply to procedural standing
cases because its standards are explained only in terms of a hypothetical,
and are not applied elsewhere in the opinion.279 The footnote's emphasis
on special immediacy and redressability standards, however, indicates an
intent to apply these standards to the ultimate harm (construction of the
dam), not the procedural violation.' The D.C. Circuit also focused on
the probability that the ultimate harm will be redressed in cases involving
challenges to broad programmatic decisions. 8 ' Thus, by making the procedural injury the foundation of injury in fact, the Tenth Circuit may
have misapplied the footnote. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit's approach
is more logical, and comes closer to expressing a workable test than the
unarticulated standards of footnote seven.
Under the decision in Rio Hondo, the important nexus is between
the agency's failure to follow procedure and the harm to the plaintiff's
concrete interests. If the plaintiff can show the procedural failure results
in harm to her concrete interests, then the elements of causation and redressability are applied to the procedural injury rather than the injury to
concrete interests. Although the Tenth Circuit did not acknowledge this
fact, the Rio Hondo approach essentially incorporates much of the traditional causation element into the injury in fact test. The critical reason for
ruling in the Committee's favor was the court's finding that failure to
follow NEPA procedure would cause increased environmental risk to the
Rio Hondo watershed.f 2 The Committee could then prove harm to its
concrete interests by showing its members had used the watershed for
much of their lifetimes, and planned to continue to use the area in the
future. n3
The court's approach comports with the footnote seven standard in
that it essentially reduces the redressability requirement for standing under NEPA. If this were not so, NEPA claims would otherwise fail due to
the fact that it requires the agency to follow certain decision making procedure, but does not mandate any particular outcome.' Under Rio
Hondo, the redressability requirement has bite only in the rare situation
where the agency that must follow the procedure is not a party to the

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See Sunstein, supra note 185, at 225.
Gatchel, supra note 186, at 102-03.
See supra notes 266-72.
Committee to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445,448-49 (1996).
Id. at 450.
See supra note 235.
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case. More importantly, the causation requirement, which footnote seven
does not expressly relax, is essentially kept intact-it is incorporated into
the injury in fact test. The injury in fact test in Rio Hondo can only be
met if the court finds the agency's failure to follow procedure caused
harm to the plaintiff's concrete interests.2 "
The Rio Hondo opinion is significant for two reasons. First, the
court recognized that a procedural injury may be the foundation for a
claim brought under NEPA.' This lowers the barriers that the requirements of redressability and causation traditionally imposed on claims
based on procedure-enforcing statutes like NEPA. Second, the court expressly found that the agency's failure to follow procedure would result
in increased environmental risk. To establish standing, the plaintiff
merely had to show its members had a geographical nexus to the area at
risk in order to show injury to its concrete interests. Therefore, Rio
Hondo provides a clear step-by-step process that plaintiffs can follow to
prove standing under NEPA, and other action-forcing statutes, like the
National Forest Management Act (NFMA)Y or the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act.'
First, the plaintiff must show sufficient connection with the managed area to satisfy the geographical nexus test. Second, the plaintiff
must show that its concrete interests are injured by some failure of the
agency to follow the mandates of the law. The description of the injury is
critical to establishing this part of standing.289 The plaintiff should phrase
the injury in terms of harm to some concrete opportunity that is protected
by the agency's procedural statute, such as some injustice the statute was
designed to prevent.' ° In cases involving failure to follow NEPA procedure, this will usually mean characterizing the harm as increased environmental risk resulting from uninformed decision making. For claims
challenging planning decisions under statutes like the NFMA, this may

285. Rio Hondo, 102 F.3d at 449.
286. Id.
287. Congress initially enacted the Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act
of 1974. 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (1994). NFMA was enacted in 1976, in an amendment to the Resources
Planning Act, 83 Stat. 852 (codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). The Act directs the Forest
Service to develop land and resource management plans ("forest plans") for each forest unit in the
National Forest System. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1994). The plans must also be prepared in accordance
with NEPA. Id.
288. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1994). The Act was signed into law the same day as NFMA, and
prescribes planning procedures for the Bureau of Land Management.
289. Murphy, supra note 195, at 255.
290. Id. This not only assures redressability, but is necessary for statutes like NEPA and
NFMA, which do not contain citizen suit provisions. Id. For injuries under these statutes, the right to
judicial review must be achieved by reliance upon the Administrative Procedure Act, which requires
the injury to be contemplated "within the meaning of the relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).

1998]

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

mean phrasing the injury as the lost opportunity to appreciate a forest, an
interest acknowledged by NFMA.29
The Tenth Circuit has not addressed standing for procedural injury
claims brought under statutes other than NEPA. Other circuits that have
addressed the issue are split.' The Tenth Circuit's clear affirmation of
procedural rights based upon NEPA claims, however, may signal a willingness to recognize standing for plaintiffs alleging procedural injuries
based upon other statutes, and using the two-prong injury in fact test.
Without deciding the issue of procedural standing under other statutes,
Rio Hondo nevertheless strengthens procedural standing for environmental plaintiffs by providing a clear blueprint to follow in bringing procedural injury claims in the future.
CONCLUSION

CERCLA is a powerful statute that imposes enormous liability on a
party that may be only partially responsible for the contamination of a
site. Although CERCLA cases are likely to become less frequent in the
future,' it remains important for courts to reduce disincentives to undertake the cleanup of hazardous substance releases that occurred in the
past. The powerful sword of strict, and joint and several liability is
needed to accomplish the difficult task of cleaning up contaminated sites.
Yet it would be foolish to wield this sword in such a way as to encourage
PRPs to hide their connection to a site or delay the cleanup of such a site
for as long as possible. The decisions in the three recent CERCLA cases
discussed indicate the Tenth Circuit's cognizance of CERCLA's swordlike qualities. These cases show wise restraint on the part of the court,
which avoids penalizing PRPs unnecessarily.
With regard to standing for environmental plaintiffs, Rio Hondo
involved NEPA claims factually similar to the dam hypothetical in footnote seven of Lujan. For this reason, Rio Hondo did not expand Tenth
Circuit procedural standing outright. The Tenth Circuit has yet to grant
standing for any procedural injury beyond NEPA claims. Yet Rio Hondo
offers hope for plaintiffs wishing to bring procedural injury claims under
other action-forcing statutes like NFMA. The opinion eliminates much of

291. Murphy, supra note 195, at 255; see National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600,
1604(e), 1604(g) (1994).
292. Compare Sierra Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753, 758 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that
environmental plaintiffs could not challenge a forest plan because the plan "does not effectuate any
on-the-ground environmental changes," and, therefore could not be the basis for injury), with
Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1300, 1307-08 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the procedural
standing requirements for claims brought under the NFMA are similar to the standards of NEPA
claims, because Congress intended procedural safeguards to be similar in the two, and in this case
those procedural requirements had been satisfied by the plaintiffs).
293. CERCLA liability is widely known and offers powerful incentive for PRPs to prevent
releases of hazardous substances in the future. Thus, as cleanup of old sites continues, the number of
newly contaminated sites should decrease over time.

890

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:3

the confusion surrounding footnote seven standing, and focuses the
plaintiff's attention on establishing the elements of the two-part injury in
fact test. Rio Hondo may have laid the groundwork necessary for plaintiffs to use NFMA to challenge an agency's decision. It may now be possible to present a well-fashioned argument that the agency's failure to
follow NFMA procedure will result in a lost opportunity to appreciate a
forest, or similar injury to a concrete interest that the statute sought to
prevent.
Douglas Sinor

